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Abstract—P2P systems are highly susceptible to Sybil attacks,
in which an attacker creates a large number of identities and uses
them to control a substantial fraction of the system. Persea is the
most recent approach towards designing a social network based
Sybil-resistant DHT. Unlike prior Sybil-resistant P2P systems
based on social networks, Persea does not rely on two key
assumptions: (i) that the social network is fast mixing, and
(ii) that there is a small ratio of attack edges to honest peers.
Both assumptions have been shown to be unreliable in real
social networks. The hierarchical distribution of node IDs in
Persea confines a large attacker botnet to a considerably smaller
region of the ID space than in a normal P2P system and its
replication mechanism lets a peer to retrieve the desired results
even if a given region is occupied by attackers. However, Persea
system suffers from certain limitations, since it cannot handle the
scenario, where the malicious target returns an incorrect result
instead of just ignoring the lookup request. In this paper, we
address this major limitation of Persea through a Sybil detection
mechanism built on top of Persea system, which accommodates
inspection lookup, a specially designed lookup scheme to detect
the Sybil nodes based on their responses to the lookup query.
We design a scheme to filter those detected Sybils to ensure the
participation of honest nodes on the lookup path during regular
DHT lookup. Since the malicious nodes are opt-out from the
lookup path in our system, they cannot return any incorrect result
during regular lookup. We evaluate our system in simulations
with social network datasets and the results show that catster,
the largest network in our simulation with 149700 nodes and
5449275 edges, gains 100% lookup success rate, even when the
number of attack edges is equal to the number of benign peers
in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are inherently vulnerable to
Sybil attacks, in which an attacker creates a large number
of pseudonymous entities and use them to gain a dispropor-
tionately large influence over the system [1, 2]. The attackers
then collude to launch further attacks, such as taking over
resources and disrupting connectivity to subvert the system’s
operation. Such attacks have been shown to be quite prob-
lematic in structured P2P systems in which nodes are placed
into a distributed hash table (DHT) like Chord [3], CAN [4],
Pastry [5], and Kademlia [6]. Kademlia was the basis for
both the Kad network and Vuze, DHTs used in the popular
BitTorrent file-sharing P2P system with millions of users each.
Researchers have documented this vulnerability in real-world
systems, including the Maze P2P file-sharing system [7, 8]
and the Vanish data storage system [9].
Recent research has focused on leveraging information from
social networks to make the system robust against Sybil attack-
ers, resulting in a number of decentralized apporaches [10–
16]. The key to these approaches is the idea that honest
and malicious nodes can be effectively partitioned into two
subgraphs in the social network. The link between an honest
node and a malicious peer is called an attack edge, which
represents an act of social engineering to convince the honest
node to add the link.
These mechanisms are based on two key assumptions: (i)
that the online social networks are fast-mixing, meaning that a
random walk in the honest part of the network approaches the
unifrom distribution in a small number of steps, and (ii) that
the number of attack edges are rather limited in online social
networks. Recent studies [17–20], however, show that the
above assumptions do not hold in real-world social networks.
So, it remain an open research problem, until Persea [21]
was proposed, to design a social network based Sybil defense
mechanism, which does not rely on these assumptions.
A. Motivation
Persea [21] derives its Sybil resistance by assigning IDs
through a bootstrap tree, the graph of how nodes have joined
the system through invitations. Persea argues that building
a bootstrap tree is more realistic than assuming that the
clients have access to lists of social network connections from
a system like Facebook. Also, IDs are certified in Persea,
making attacks based on ID forging impossible outside of
attacker-controlled ID ranges. In Persea, the (key,value) pair
is replicated in evenly spaced nodes, so that even if a given
region is occupied by the attacker, the desired (key,value) pair
can be retrieved from other regions. We give a overview of
Persea system in §II.
The Persea approach offers a number of important advan-
tages over previous schemes:
• Unlike prior Sybil-resistant P2P systems based on social
networks, Persea does not rely on two key assumptions: (i)
that the social network is fast mixing, and (ii) that there is
a small ratio of attack edges to honest nodes.
• The hierarchical distribution of node IDs limits the attackers
to isolated regions in ID space.
However, Persea system suffers from certain limitations that
make its use questionable in real world scenario. In Persea
DHT, a (key,value) pair is replicated in a number of nodes and
the lookup operation is performed for each target node to get
the value, associated with the search-key. Persea assumes that
when the target node is malicious it does not return incorrect
result, rather ignores the lookup request. So, In Persea DHT,
if the initiator of a lookup retrieves the correct result from at
least one benign target, the lookup is termed to be successful.
But in real-world scenario, the malicious target may reply with
incorrect result to make it harder for the initiator to retrieve the
correct one from the set of different returned results. Persea
system cannot handle such obvious attacks.
The simplest solution to this limitation of Persea could
be implementing majority voting scheme, where the initiator
picks the result with higher count. If the counts of two types of
results are same, the initiator randomly picks one as the final
result. In our simulation, we implement the above strategy of
adversaries and evaluate Persea with majority voting scheme.
However, our results show that the lookup success rate in
Persea sharply decreases with the increase in attack edges
(See §VI), which infers that majority voting is not effective
enough to make the system robust, when the malicious target
returns incorrect result. So, the efficacy of Persea is left as an
open question in real-world scenario.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we address this major limitation of Persea and
develop a Sybil detection scheme on top of Persea system.
We propose inspection lookup to detect the Sybils, which
is a specially designed lookup mechanism to determine the
status (honest or malicious) of a node. This lookup seems
as a regular DHT lookup to a peer, whose status is being
inspected, so that an attacker cannot play a fabricated role
during inspection lookup to prove it as an honest node. We
introduce the idea of collaborative friends, the groups of
benign peers, who agree to execute the inspection lookups
for detecting the Sybils. We provide a detailed description of
our Sybil detection mechanism in §III.
We develop a mechanism to filter the detected Sybil nodes
from the lookup path for ensuring the participation of benign
peers during regular DHT lookup. We then incorporate our
filtering scheme with the lookup mechanism in Persea. So, in
our system the attackers are opt-out of the lookup path and
thus, they can neither intercept a lookup (as an intermediate
node) nor return an incorrect result (as the target node).
While we incorporate our Sybil detection mechanism with
Persea, we name the new system iPersea (improved Persea),
which inherits the advantages of Persea that it gains over
prior social network based Sybil-resistant systems. So, iPersea
does not depend on the fast-mixing social network and small
ratio of attack edges to honest peers. We justify our claims
through evaluations in §VI. We simulate for networks with
different clustering coefficients to show that our system does
not depend on the fast-mixing nature of a network. The
clustering coefficient is a measure of degree to which nodes in
a network tend to cluster together [22, 23], and it is therefore
directly related to the fast-mixing property of a network [23].
To validate the claim that iPersea does not depend on the small
ratio of attack edges to honest peers, we evaluate for this ratio,
upto 1.5 and find consistent results, where the lookup success
rate for any network in our evaluations is no less than 92.9%.
Our experimental results show that 70% of lookups succeed
in Persea, while the ratio of attack edges to honest nodes is
0.5 in facebook social network. However, in iPersea, 93.6%
lookups succeed in facebook, even when the ratio of attack
edges to honest nodes is increased to one. In flickr and catster
(largest network in our simulation with 149700 nodes), 100%
lookups get successful in our system when we have equal
number of attack edges and honest nodes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we give
a overview of Persea system in §II and explain the design our
Sybil detection mechanism in §III. We then describe the attack
model in §IV before presenting our simulation results in §VI.
In §VII we discuss the related works in Sybil defense. We give
a direction to our future work §VIII and then conclude in §IX.
II. OVERVIEW OF PERSEA
In this section, we briefly describe the design of Persea [21].
We begin with the overview of the system and then address
the ID space allocation, ID certification and key replication.
We also describe the routing table organization and lookup
mechanism of Persea.
A. Design Overview
Persea consists of two layers: a social network layer (the
bootstrap graph) and the DHT layer. In Persea, an edge refers
to a link between two nodes in the DHT layer. The bootstrap
network and DHT are simultaneously built starting with a set
of bootstrap nodes. The bootstrap nodes are the initiators of the
system. They are connected to each other in both the bootstrap
network and the DHT. Node IDs in the DHT are assigned to
the bootstrap nodes such that they are evenly spaced over the
circular ID space. Thus, the ID space of the DHT is divided
into one region for each bootstrap node.
A new peer must join the Persea system through an invi-
tation from an existing node in the network. In general, it is
expected that a node that is invited is socially known to the
inviting peer. When a node is invited, it not only becomes a
part of the bootstrap network but also gets a node ID in DHT
layer. The new node gets a chunk of node IDs that it can use to
invite more nodes for joining the network. ID assignments and
chunk allocations are put into certificates signed by the parent
nodes, and certificates are stored in the DHT itself to allow
for reliable distributed checking of the chain of certificates all
the way up to the bootstrap nodes.
The DHT layer of Persea is based on Kademlia [6], a
DHT that is widely adopted for the BitTorrent file-sharing
P2P system. The main difference in Persea is that IDs are
replicated evenly around the ID space for greater resiliency
given the ID distribution scheme.
B. Hierarchical ID Space
We now briefly describe how node IDs are distributed in
Persea. Each bootstrap node has a contiguous range of node
IDs called a chunk, which includes the bootstrap node’s ID. A
bootstrap node divides its chunk of node IDs into sub-chunks
based on the chunk-factor, a system parameter.
When a bootstrap node invites a peer to join the system,
it assigns a node ID to the joining node from one of its sub-
chunks and also assigns the new node control over the rest
of the sub-chunk for further distribution. The newly joined
node becomes the authority for distributing node IDs from the
given sub-chunk. Thus, once the joining node becomes a part
of the system, it can invite more nodes to join the system.
Based on the invitation-relationship among peers, a bootstrap
tree is formed in which an inviter node is the parent of its
invited peers. If the number of bootstrap node is more than
one, then it would have a forest of trees, where each bootstrap
node is the root of each tree. The chunk-factor and size of the
ID space define the maximum possible height and width of
a tree. This mechanism has the advantage that even if a bot
compromises a node and leverages it to add a large number
of malicious nodes to the system, they will be still confined
in a particular region of ID space.
C. Routing table organization
In the DHT layer, each node maintains a routing table of b
node lists for a b-bit ID space. Each list has up to k entries
and is called a k-bucket. Each k-bucket entry contains the IP
address, port, node ID, and public key of another node. The
list is organized so that the ID of a node in the bth list of a
node with ID i should share the first b− 1 bits of i and have
a different bth bit from i.
D. Replication
In Persea, a (key,value) pair is stored in evenly spaced
nodes, so that even if a given region is occupied by the
attackers, the desired (key, value) pair can be retrieved from
other regions. In Persea, the ID space is virtually divided into
R regions and the (key,value) pair is replicated in R evenly
spaced nodes, one in each virtual region. The evaluations in
Persea show that R = 7 gives the optimal results for the
networks, considered in their simulation [21].
E. Lookup mechanism
Node lookup in Persea is initiated by the lookup(key)
request where a node queries the α nodes in its k-buckets
that are the closest ones to the desired key. Each of the α
nodes sends the initiator β node IDs from its k-bucket closest
to the target node. From the set of returned node IDs, the
initiator selects α nodes for the next iteration. This process is
iterated until the target is found or no nodes are returned that
are closer than the previous best results.
The initiator of a lookup performs R such independent
parallel lookup operations and when an owner is found
from any of R independent lookups, the initiator sends the
owner a message for either the store (put(key, value)) or
retrieval (get(key)) operation. We incorporate our Sybil-
filtering scheme (see §III-C) with this lookup mechanism to
opt-out the attackers from the lookup path.
III. SYBIL DETECTION MECHANISM
Our Sybil detection mechanism detects an attacker by
exploiting its malicious behavior during a lookup. We propose
inspection lookup to detect the Sybils, which determines the
status (honest or malicious) of a node based on its response to
the lookup request. Inspection lookup accommodates certain
strategies to appear as a regular lookup to a peer, whose status
is being inspected, so that an attacker cannot fabricate its
behavior during inspection lookup to prove it as a benign node.
The status (honest or malicious) of a node, determined through
inspection lookup, is used to filter Sybil nodes during regular
lookup. We incorporate our filtering scheme with the lookup
mechanism of Persea to ensure higher lookup success rate by
ensuring the participation of honest peers on the lookup path.
Our Sybil detection mechanism is based on the following
assumptions:
• The adversary intercepts as many lookup queries as possi-
ble. As a target node, an attacker does not return the correct
value, associated with the search-key.
• An honest node adheres to the protocol and acts legitimately.
In our mechanism, the status of a node represents whether
it is honest or malicious, represented by ’+’ (honest) or
’-’ (malicious). Each parent node determines the status of
its direct children with the help of selected peers, called
collaborative friends.
A. Selecting collaborative friends
A peer (say it node P) requests its parents, grandparents
and other ancestor nodes to suggest trusted peers, who agree
to be the collaborative friends of node P for detecting the
Sybils. An ancestor can suggest any number of collaborative
friends, depending upon number of peers it trust and their
willingness to collaborate. The more collaborative friends,
node P has from different layers of hierarchical ID space, the
harder it is for the child (may be, an attacker) of node P to
distinguish an inspection lookup from the regular one. Since,
node P selects the initiator of an inspection lookup from the set
of its collaborative friends, the randomness in the placement
of collaborative friends in ID space contributes in rising the
hurdles to distinguish between inspection and regular lookup.
So, node P requests its ancestors at each upper layer to be its
collaborative friends and suggest more trusted nodes.
In ideal case, an ancestor node always returns trusted
collaborative friends. However, in real-world scenario, an
ancestor, which is not responsible enough in detecting the
Sybils, may return randomly-selected collaborative friends. In
our experiments, we consider both scenarios and the results
for Sybil-detection and lookup success rate show very subtle
differences between two approaches. So, random selection of
collaborative friends can be effective in detecting the Sybils
and consequently gaining high lookup success rate.
B. Inspection lookup
The goal of inspection lookup is to detect the Sybils based
on their responses to the lookup messages. To design an
inspection lookup, we adapt the basic lookup mechanism of
Persea (see §II) and incorporate following strategies so that
an inspection lookup appears to be a regular lookup to the
peer and consequently an attacker cannot distinguish it from
a regular lookup.
• The source and target of an inspection lookup and also the
node, whose status is to be inspected, are randomly selected.
• Inspection lookups are performed at uniformly distributed
random interval.
• During the lookup operation in DHT, the role of a peer on
the lookup path may be an intermediate hop or the target. In
each inspection lookup, it is randomly selected which role
(intermediate hop or target) of a peer would be inspected.
While inspecting the role of a child as an intermediate
hop, node P selects a peer (say it node F) from its list
of collaborative friends to be the initiator of the inspection
lookup. It selects one of its direct children (say it node T) as
the target node. These selections are made randomly. From the
set of direct children, whose status are not inspected yet, node
P randomly selects a child (say it node C) as an intermediate
node of the lookup. Based on the success of inspection lookup,
the status of node C is determined.
According to the suggestion of node P, node F sends the
lookup request to node C. Since the inspection lookup appears
as a regular lookup to Node C, it follows the mechanism of
regular lookup and returns β nodes from its k-buckets that
are closest ones to the search-key. If the set of returned nodes
does not include node T, node F then sends lookup request
to each of these β nodes in the next iteration. This process is
iterated until the target is found or no nodes are returned that
are closer than the previous best results.
In the ID space of Persea, where the node IDs are hier-
archically distributed, there is an obvious lookup path from
node C to node T through their parent node P. So, if the
inspection lookup does not reach node T, node C is considered
responsible for this failure and gets ’-’ status. Node C gets ’+’
status when the lookup succeeds, since an honest node directs
a lookup towards the target.
When the role of a peer as the target node is inspected,
a randomly selected collaborative friend of node P (say it
node F1) stores a (key,value) pair in node C and makes sure
that the key matches with the node ID of node C. After a
random interval, the lookup request is sent to node C from
a collaborative friend of node P (say it node F2) to return
the value associated with the search-key. Node F2 is informed
by node P about the desired value that should be returned by
node C. If it is not returned, node C is marked with ’-’ status.
If node C returns the correct value, it gets ’+’ status, since
an honest peer always returns the appropriate value associated
with the search-key.
False positive and false negative. During inspection lookup,
an honest intermediate node, whose status is being inspected,
may unintentionally return malicious peers that are closest to
the target, increasing the probability of a lookup to fail. If the
lookup fails, the honest node is marked with ’-’ status that
increases the rate of false positive.
The rate of false positive is zero when the role of a peer as
the target node is inspected, as an honest node always returns
the correct value associated with the search-key. The rate of
false negative is zero in both cases, since our mechanism cor-
rectly identifies an attacker exploiting its malicious response
to the inspection lookup message.
The above discussions on false-positive and false-negative
are applicable to the scenarios, which abide by the assumption
of selecting trusted nodes only, as the collaborative friends.
However, for random selection of collaborative friends an
attacker may get selected. In this case, if the attacker initiates
an inspection lookup as a collaborative friend, a peer, whose
status is inspected, gets ’-’ status if it is honest and is marked
with ’+’ status if it is malicious, irrespective of the outcome of
inspection lookup. Thus, for random selection of collaborative
friends, the rate of both false-positive and false-negative may
get increased.
C. Sybil-filtering Mechanism
In this section, we describe the mechanism to opt-out the
Sybils from the lookup path for ensuring the participation of
honest nodes during regular lookup. In our evaluations, we
incorporate our filtering mechanism with the basic lookup
scheme of Persea.
During regular lookup, before selecting a peer (say it node
Q) as an intermediate hop, the initiator of the lookup (say
it node L) asks the parent of node Q to send its status.
We assume, a malicious peer invites other attackers to join
the network and promotes its children by giving ’+’ status.
According to these assumptions, a malicious node gets ’-’
status only from a benign parent. So, if the status of node
Q is found ’+’, node L gets the status of node Q’s parent.
This process is repeated for the other ancestors of node Q
until the bootstrap node is reached or the ’-’ status is found
for an ancestor.
If the bootstrap layer is reached, it suggests that none of
node Q’s ancestors is marked with ’-’ status. So, node Q is
considered as a benign peer and gets selected for the lookup.
If ’-’ status is found for node Q or any of its ancestor nodes,
node Q is termed as a malicious peer and does not get selected
as an intermediate node for the lookup. Once node L gets the
status of node Q, it stores that status to be used in future
lookup.
Node L follows the same procedure, as described above, to
get the status of a target node, for deciding whether to accept
the value, returned by that node.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
We inherit most of the features of the attack model in
Persea [21], where attackers use social engineering to create
attack edges in the social network. When a malicious peer
joins the network, it gets a chunk of node IDs for further
distribution and we assume, an attacker invites only malicious
peers for joining the network to infiltrate the system with as
many attackers as possible. Also, the attacker promotes its
children by assigning ’+’ (honest) status without performing
any inspection lookup for them.
As in Persea, we assume that the attackers know the IDs of
all other attackers and store only the information of malicious
nodes in their k-buckets. The goal of the adversary is to
intercept as many lookup queries as possible. During lookup,
If an attacker gets the lookup message, it returns the node
IDs of malicious peers from its k-bucket. When the attacker
receives a get message, instead of just ignoring the message
(as in Persea [21]), it returns an incorrect value in our attack
model.
In our Sybil detection mechanism, for random selection
of collaborative friends, an attacker (say it node A) may
be selected as the collaborative friend. We assume, as the
collaborative friend of a node (say it node P), when node A
initiates an inspection lookup to inspect the status of a child
of node P (say it node C), whatever be the results of lookup;
if node C is a malicious peer, node A informs node P that the
lookup succeeds, however, if node C is an honest peer, the
response of node A to node P says, the lookup fails.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop analytical models to estimate
average hop-count per regular lookup and the rate of false
positive and false negative in our Sybil detection mechanism.
A. Lookup path length
We develop an analytical model to estimate the average
hop-count per lookup. Let ep represent the average edges per
node in a network and ah be the number of attack edges per
honest node. So, ah = g/n, where g represents the number of
attack edges and n is number of honest nodes. When a lookup
operation starts in our system, the initiator of the lookup
selects α nodes from its routing table. So, the number of
malicious peers in the set of α nodes is represented by α× ah
ep
.
In the next iteration, each of α nodes returns β closest nodes
(to the target) and a malicious peer always returns adversary
nodes. Let mi represent the number of malicious nodes that
the initiator gets in the set of α × β nodes in ith(i ≥ 1)
iterations. So, in the first iteration, the number of malicious
peers that the initiator gets in the set of α × β nodes is:
pm1 =
(
α× ah
ep
× β
)
+
(
(1 − α× ah
ep
)× β × ah
ep
)
.
The attackers try to subvert the lookup query and thus the
number of attackers in each iteration contributes to estimate
the probability of a lookup to succeed. The number of ma-
licious nodes, selected by the initiator in the set of α nodes
for (i + 1)th iteration is: α× mi
α×β
= mi
β
. So, the probability
(pmi) of choosing a malicious nodes from the set of α nodes
at iteration i is represented by mi
α×β
. Thus, at any iteration
j(j ≥ 1), we get pmj by evaluating
∏j
i=1 pmi . The lookup
continues until the target node is found and we estimate the
probability of lookup failure at iteration j by evaluating pmj .
In our analysis, to estimate the path length of a lookup, we
take a constant lc representing a very low probability of lookup
failure and then we calculate the minimum value of i as the
lookup path length, where pmi ≤ lc.
We consider lc = 0.001 to get the lookup path length
from our analytical model. To compare our analytical results
with the results from our evaluations, we consider ah = 1.0,
α = 5 and β = 7 (as used in our simulations). The value of
ep depends upon individual network. Figure 1(a) shows the
differences between our analysis and simulation for average
hop-count per regular lookup. We find that our analytical
estimations are very close to the experimental results.
B. Rate of false positive
To estimate the rate of false positive, we use the above
analytical model for measuring pmj . We consider both trusted
and randomly selected collaborative friends in our analysis.
For trusted collaborative friends, the rate of false positive
is zero when the role of a peer as the target is inspected.
However, when the role of a peer as the intermediate node is
inspected, we may get a rate of false positive, since an attacker
may intercept the lookup (see §III for explanation). So, the
number of attackers, selected in an iteration is directly related
to the rate of false positive. Thus, we use pmj to estimate the
false positive rate and put j = 1 in this case. In our analysis,
we assume that j = 1 is a reasonable estimation for hop-count
per inspection lookup and also, we get the same value for j,
when we take the floor of the results for average hop-count
per inspection lookup in our evaluations (see Table V).
While comparing our analytical estimations for false posi-
tive rate with the experimental results, we consider the ratio
of attack edges to honest nodes is one. Figure 1(b) illustrates
the results for this comparison. We find that the difference
between analysis and simulation is 0.01 in the network datasets
of hamsterster (ham), flickr (flic), wiki-Vote (wiki) and ca-
AstroPh (astro). In the social network dataset of facebook
(fb), we get exactly same results from our analytical model
and simulations.
Now, we estimate the false positive rate in a scenario,
where the collaborative friends are randomly selected. In
this case, the false positive rate may get increased not only
by the attackers on the lookup path, but also by malicious
collaborative friends. An attacker, as a collaborative friend,
contributes to increase the false positive rate when it is selected
to initiate an inspection lookup and the peer, whose status
is being inspected in that lookup, is an honest one. So, to
estimate the false positive rate, we measure the probability of
selecting a malicious collaborative friend and an honest node
(to inspect its status) in the same inspection lookup and then
take the union of this probability with pmj (j = 1).
Let a node N be at level lh + 1 of the hierarchical ID
space and cnl be the number of collaborative friends from
each of its upper level. For simplicity of analysis, we consider
cnl is same for each level. In our analysis, ep represents the
average edges per node in a network and ah is the number of
attack edges per honest node. So, when a node is randomly
selected as a collaborative friend, ah
ep
represents its probability
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Fig. 1. Comparison between results from analysis and simulation
TABLE I
TOPOLOGIES
Network Description Nodes Edges Avg. Clustering Coeff.
hamsterster (ham) Social network of hamsterster.com 2426 16631 0.08
facebook (fb) Social network of facebook.com 63731 1545686 0.15
flickr (flic) Network dataset of flickr.com 80513 5899882 0.17
wiki-Vote (wiki) Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network 7115 103689 0.21
catster (cat) Social network of Catster.com 149700 5449275 0.43
ca-AstroPh (astro) Collaboration network of Arxiv Astro Physics 18772 396160 0.63
to be malicious. Thus, the expected number of malicious
collaborative friends of node N is: ah
ep
× lh × cnl. When node
N randomly selects a peer from its set of collaborative friends
to initiate an inspection lookup,
ah
ep
×lh×cnl
lh×cnl
= ah
ep
represents
the probability of this collaborative friend to be an attacker.
To inspect the status, the probability of selecting an honest
child of node N is: ep−ah
ep
. Now, we measure the probability
of selecting a malicious collaborative friend and an honest
node (to inspect its status) in the same inspection lookup as:
ah
ep
× ep−ah
ep
. So, for random selection of collaborative friends,
we calculate (ah
ep
× ep−ah
ep
) + pmj − (ahep ×
ep−ah
ep
× pmj ) for
the estimation of false positive rate.
We compare our analytical estimations with the results
from our simulation, shown in Figure 1(c), where g/n =
1.0. The difference in false positive rate between analysis
and evaluations is 0.01 in ham and 0.02 in the network
of fb, wiki and astro. We get exactly same results from our
analytical model and simulation in the social network datasets
of flic and cat (the largest network in our evaluations).
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we describe the design of our simulation
and present the results of our experiments. We build our Sybil
detection mechanism on top of Persea system and inherit
hierarchical node ID distribution and certification, routing
table organization and replication mechanisms of Persea [21].
We incorporate our Sybil-filtering scheme with the lookup
mechanism of Persea to achieve higher lookup success rate.
We evaluate for a 31-bit ID space. For different system
parameters, we use the same values as used in Persea, such
as: chunk-factor cf = 0.65, redundancy R = 7, and Kad
parameters α = 5, β = 7, and bucket size k = 7. In our
evaluations, we assume that each node has one collaborative
friend at each of its upper layers.
We simulate for networks with different clustering coeffi-
cients and the experimental results show that the effectiveness
of our Sybil detection scheme and the lookup success rate
do not depend on the fast-mixing nature of a network. We
represent the number of attack edges by g and the number of
benign peers by n. To validate our claim that iPersea gains
high lookup success rate, even for a high value of g/n, we
evaluate for this ratio, upto 1.5.
A. Building the Network and Joining of Attackers
We follow the exact same approach, as in Persea [21], for
building the network and joining of attackers. So, we build
the bootstrap tree by emulating the process of nodes joining
via existing connections in a social network graph. Although
our system does not rely on the structure of the social graph
TABLE II
RATE OF FALSE-POSITIVE FOR VARYING g/n [TRUSTED COLLABORATIVE
FRIENDS]
g/n 0.10 0.50 0.80 1.0 1.25 1.50
ham (0.08) 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.05 0.09 0.095
fb (0.15) 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.069 0.07
flic (0.17) 0.037 0.039 0.04 0.042 0.048 0.055
wiki (0.21) 0.07 0.078 0.08 0.09 0.092 0.093
cat (0.43) 0.077 0.079 0.08 0.082 0.09 0.12
astro (0.63) 0.06 0.063 0.064 0.067 0.09 0.11
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(a) hamsterster (0.08)
0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0.75 0.9 1.05 1.2 1.35 1.520
40
60
80
100
g / n
L
o
o
k
u
p
 S
u
c
c
e
s
s
−
R
a
te
 (%
)
 
 
 Basic Persea 
 Improved Persea (Trusted Collaborative Friend)
 Improved Persea (Random Collaborative Friend)
(b) facebook (0.15)
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(c) flickr (0.17)
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(d) wiki-Vote (0.21)
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(e) catster (0.43)
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Fig. 2. Lookup success rates in networks with different clustering-coefficients
for its security properties, we use real social network graphs
to provide a realistic basis for the choices that nodes make in
building the tree.
As we construct the bootstrap graph, the nodes in these
datasets are considered to be honest and attacker nodes are
further added to the network. We implement Persea system
with a deployment that starts with seven randomly selected
bootstrap nodes. We then use breadth-first-search over the
TABLE III
RATE OF FALSE-POSITIVE FOR VARYING g/n [RANDOMLY SELECTED
COLLABORATIVE FRIENDS]
g/n 0.10 0.50 0.80 1.0 1.25 1.50
ham (0.08) 0.046 0.047 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.19
fb (0.15) 0.063 0.064 0.067 0.068 0.071 0.073
flic (0.17) 0.037 0.039 0.04 0.045 0.052 0.06
wiki (0.21) 0.07 0.078 0.09 0.121 0.124 0.126
cat (0.43) 0.077 0.08 0.084 0.087 0.097 0.13
astro (0.63) 0.06 0.07 0.079 0.083 0.108 0.13
TABLE IV
RATE OF FALSE-NEGATIVE FOR VARYING g/n [RANDOMLY SELECTED
COLLABORATIVE FRIENDS]
g/n 0.10 0.50 0.80 1.0 1.25 1.50
ham (0.08) 0.0 0.0 0.031 0.04 0.05 0.095
fb (0.15) 0.0 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
flic (0.17) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.003 0.004 0.005
wiki (0.21) 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.031 0.032 0.033
cat (0.43) 0.0 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.01
astro (0.63) 0.0 0.007 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.02
social graph to add other nodes. After adding all of the
honest nodes, we add Sybil nodes by creating attack edges
to randomly selected honest peers.
We evaluate our mechanism in simulations for one col-
laboration network : ca-AstroPh (astro) and five social net-
work datasets: facebook (fb), flickr (flic), catster (cat), wiki-
Vote (wiki) and hamsterster (ham). Here, wiki uses directed
edges to indicate “who trusts whom”, which we believe is
a good proxy for the notion that parent node would accept
another node as a child in the bootstrap graph. In our eval-
uations,ham,fb,flic and cat are social networks drawn from
the users on Hamsterster.com, Facebook.com, Flickr.com and
Catster.com Websites, respectively.
In our evaluations, cat is the largest network with 149700
nodes and 5449275 edges. While considering clustering coeffi-
cients, ham and astro are the networks with the smallest (0.08)
and largest (0.63) clustering coefficient, respectively. Table I
shows the sizes and clustering coefficients of the network
datasets 1.
B. Rate of False Positive and False Negative
In this section, we show the results for the rate of false
positive and false negative in our Sybil detection mechanism,
when the collaborative friends are either trusted or randomly
selected.
When trusted nodes are selected as collaborative friends,
the results in Table II show that for g/n = 1.0, the rate
of false positive is 0.05 in ham (network smallest clustering
coefficient) and 0.067 in astro (network largest clustering
coefficient). When the number of attack edges is equal to the
1http://snap.stanford.edu/data , http://konect.uni-koblenz.de,
http://socialcomputing.asu.edu/pages/datasets ,
number of honest peers, the maximum rate of false positive
for any network is found 0.09 in wiki.
For the random selection of collaborative friends, the rate
of false positive slightly increases as compared to the trusted
collaborative friends; for example, in cat, the largest network
in our experiments, when g/n = 1.0, the rates of false
positive are 0.082 and 0.087 for trusted and randomly selected
collaborative friends, respectively. Table III shows the rates of
false positive for randomly selected collaborative friends.
The rate of false negative is zero for trusted collaborative
friends. However, for randomly selected collaborative friends,
the rates of false negative vary in the range between 0.001 (fb)
and 0.04 (ham), when the ratio of attack edges to the number
of honest peers is one (shown in Table IV). The rate of false
negative gets much lower for decreasing g/n; for example,
in flic, the rate of false negative is zero when g/n = 0.80.
C. Lookup Success Rate
We evaluate Persea with majority voting scheme and then
compare the lookup success rate with iPersea for networks
with different clustering coefficients, shown in Figure 2. The
results show that iPersea performs much better than Persea.
For increasing g/n, lookup success rate in Persea decreases
sharply. We evaluate iPersea for g/n upto 1.5 and find
consistent results for increasing g/n; in iPersea, the lookup
success rate for any network in our simulation is no less than
92.9%. We get 100% lookup success rate in cat and flic for
both trusted and randomly selected collaborative friends, even
when the number of attack edges is equal to the number of
honest peers in our system.
When g/n = 1.0 in ham (network with lowest clustering
coefficient), the lookup success rate in Persea is 59%, whereas
TABLE V
AVERAGE HOP-COUNT IN INSPECTION LOOKUP [g/n = 1.5]
Network Trusted Random
collaborative friend collaborative friend
ham (0.08) 1.27 1.35
fb (0.15) 1.29 1.29
flic (0.17) 1.41 1.42
wiki (0.21) 1.24 1.26
cat (0.43) 1.69 1.71
astro (0.63) 1.10 1.11
TABLE VI
AVERAGE HOP-COUNT IN REGULAR LOOKUP [g/n = 1.5]
Network Persea iPersea (Trusted iPersea (Random
collaborative friend) collaborative friend)
ham (0.08) 2.85 2.80 2.84
fb (0.15) 4.79 4.70 4.70
flic (0.17) 3.84 3.44 3.50
wiki (0.21) 3.24 3.18 3.20
cat (0.43) 3.69 3.59 3.62
astro (0.63) 3.93 3.87 3.88
the percentage of successful lookup in iPersea is 100% for
trusted collaborative friends and 99% for randomly selected
collaborative friends. In astro (network with largest clustering
coefficient), 54% lookups succeed in Persea when g/n = 1.0.
For the same ratio, the lookup success rates in iPersea are
97.5% and 96.6% for trusted and randomly selected collabo-
rative friends, respectively.
Our experimental results show that the lookup success rates
for trusted and randomly selected collaborative friends remain
same in cat, flic and wiki, when the number of attack edges
is equal to the number of honest peers. For the same ratio
of attack edges to honest peers, while comparing these two
approaches of selecting collaborative friends, the differences
in the percentage of successful lookup in other networks are as
follows: 0.04% in fb, 0.09% in astro and 1% in ham. Hence,
the lookup success rates for random selection of collaborative
friends are very close to that in the ideal scenario, which
assumes, the collaborative friends are trustworthy.
D. Overhead
We evaluate to figure out the overhead of our system in
terms of average hop-count per lookup. Our experimental
results show the overhead for both inspection and regular
lookups, when the collaborative friends are either trusted or
randomly selected. We also compare our overheads for regular
lookup with Persea.
Inspection lookup: Let us assume, the role of node C as
the intermediate hop gets inspected. In ideal case, node C has
the target of the lookup in its friend-list and in this scenario,
the number of intermediate peer to reach the target is one.
However, hop-count increases if the target node is not a direct
friend of node C. Table V shows the results for average hop-
count per inspection lookup.
The results illustrate that when the trusted nodes are selected
as collaborative friends, average hop-count for different net-
works vary in the range between 1.10 (astro) and 1.69 (cat).
For random selection of collaborative friends, the minimum
and maximum average hop-counts per inspection lookup are
1.11 (astro) and 1.71 (cat), respectively. Hence, the differ-
ences between these two approaches of selecting collaborative
friends are quite subtle, in terms of average hop-count per
inspection lookup.
Regular lookup: Our evaluations figure out the overheads
associated with regular lookups, shown in Table VI, which
also represent the overhead for a peer to get the status of a
node from its parent. The increase in hop-count is found very
small, when the collaborative friends are randomly selected
instead of selecting the trusted peers only.
The results show that iPersea achieves some improvements
over Persea while considering the average hop-count per
regular lookup. In both Persea and iPersea, the maximum hop-
count per regular lookup is found in fb, which is 4.79 in Persea
and 4.70 in iPersea for both trusted and random collaborative
friends. In cat, the largest network of our simulation, average
hop-count per regular lookup is 3.69 in Persea, which 3.59 for
trusted collaborative friends and 3.62 for randomly selected
collaborative friends in iPersea.
VII. RELATED WORK
Sybil attacks can be leveraged to greatly undermine the
operations of a variety of systems, including P2P systems
(as examined in this paper), online social networks (OSNs),
wireless sensor networks, online ratings systems, and more.
Because of the power and generality of the Sybil attack, a large
number of defenses have been proposed [24]. Since we have
already discussed about Persea, in this section we examine
other major approaches proposed in literature that use social
network in their Sybil defense mechanisms.
A number of works have proposed Sybil detection tech-
niques or Sybil resistance based on random walks over a
social network [10–13, 15, 16, 25]. The basic idea is that
we can divide the social network into a Sybil region and
an honest region connected via a small number of attack
edges (a small cut). Random walks starting from the honest
region have a low probability of ending in the Sybil region.
This can be leveraged in a variety of ways, leading to de-
tection mechanisms [12, 13, 15, 25], and Sybil-resistant P2P
designs [10, 11, 16].
All of these mechanisms require the absence of small cuts
within the honest region in the underlying social network
(i.e., the honest region should be fast-mixing). Experimental
results of Mohaisen et al., however, show that the mixing
time of many real social networks is slower than the mixing
time assumed by these works [17]. Mohaisen et al. also
point out that some of these works have made questionable
assumptions in their evaluations, which may have helped
lead to the good results that have been published for these
schemes [17]. Additionally, many real-world social networks
fail to satisfy the other requirements of the systems, either
because a significant fraction of nodes are sparsely connected
or the users are organized in small tightly-knit communities,
which are sparsely interconnected [26].
Lesniewski-Laas proposes a protocol [10] in which a node
constructs its routing table through independent random walks
and recording the final node in each walk as the finger in its
routing table. The protocol [10] is extended in [11] where the
idea of layered identifiers is introduced to counter clustering
attacks.
As mentioned before, Wha¯nau relies on the assumptions
of a fast-mixing social network and small number of attack
edges, which may not hold in real social networks [17–20].
Lesniewski-Laas et. al.’s own results on mixing in real social
networks [11] still show a noticable gap from the expected
result for a fast-mixing network. Also, Wha¯nau requires sig-
nificant routing table state on the order of O(
√
n logn), where
n is the number of objects stored in the DHT. Mittal et al. point
out that the network overhead for maintaining this state can
be substantial (e.g. 800 KBps per node) [16].
X-Vine [16] works by communicating over social network
edges. It builds a DHT on the top of a social network, where
each node in the system selects a random numeric identifier. In
the identifier space, each node maintains paths to its neighbors.
In X-Vine, honest peers rate-limit the number of paths that are
allowed to be built over their adjacent edges, which helps to
limit the number of Sybil nodes that can join the system. X-
Vine, however, relies on the fast-mixing assumption and was
only evaluated with a small number of attack edges (one for
every ten honest nodes).
VIII. FUTURE WORK
We would extend our attacker detection scheme to handle
the oscillation attack. In such attacks, an attacker performs
as both honest and malicious peer at regular interval. So, if
an inspection lookup is performed during its honest-role, the
attacker may get ’+’ status. To prevent such attacks, the parent
node continues to perform inspection lookup for the child with
’+’ status at random interval and once a node gets ’-’ status,
it is sealed permanently, since we assume that an honest node
always performs legitimately.
The above mechanism is also effective in getting the current
status of a node, whose role is changed from honest to
malicious because of being compromised by an attacker. In
our future work, we would implement the above strategies to
make our system robust against such attacks.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a Sybil detection mechanism,
which accommodates a specially designed lookup mechanism
to detect the Sybils and a filtering mechanism to opt-out those
detected attackers during regular DHT lookup. We incorporate
our mechanisms with Persea to develop the system: iPersea,
which inherits the advantages of Persea that it gains over prior
systems, and ensures higher lookup success rate even when
the malicious targets respond with incorrect results. Our Sybil
detection mechanism can be amended for incorporating with
any DHT, where the children of a node are connected through
their parents, required to implement the inspection lookup.
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